Arab Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

[This is a selection of important documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict issued by Arab leaders, governments and political organizations.]

1. Statement by the PLO Executive Committee on the Camp David Agreements, Issued in Beirut, September 18, 1978.
10. Statement by the Egyptian Left-Wing Opposition Party, the National Progressive Unionist Grouping, on the Camp David Agreements, Issued in Cairo, September 25, 1978. [Excerpts]


1 STATEMENT BY THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, ISSUED IN BEIRUT, SEPTEMBER 18, 1978.¹

The Camp David meeting has resulted in an agreement which is the most dangerous link in the chain of the hostile conspiracy that has been in progress since 1948. It represents what Zionism and American imperialism have been seeking to achieve for thirty years.

[This achievement] has been presented to them by Sadat through his total surrender to their terms for the liquidation of the Palestinian and Arab cause.

After an emergency meeting called by the PLO Executive Committee and attended by representatives of all sections of the Resistance, the PLO affirms the following:

1. The Camp David agreement constitutes total surrender by Sadat to the plan that Begin put forward in his speech to the Knesset during Sadat’s treasonable visit to Jerusalem, and at the Ismailia meeting: the proposal which affirms the Zionist enemy’s insistence on consolidating his occupation of the territory of Palestine, the Golan Heights and parts of Sinai, and on the Arabs abandoning Jerusalem, which has always been a sacred symbol to the Arab nation and to all Muslims and Christians throughout the world.

2. The agreement provides clear evidence of Sadat’s total connivance at Zionism’s goals of ignoring all Palestinian national rights and indicates joint preparedness to strike at the land, the people and the revolution of Palestine under the supervision of and in conformity with the plans of American imperialism.

3. This agreement is the last step in the course of surrender pursued by Sadat’s regime, which is now renouncing Egypt’s honour and part of her national soil, and allowing the Zionist enemy’s flag to be raised over her beloved territory. It ignores the martyrs of the people and the army of Egypt who have laid down their lives so that the Arab flag might be raised over Jerusalem, Sinai and the Golan. We call on the great people of Egypt, who have never for a moment considered renouncing their national honour, the independence of their country, the right of the people of Palestine and Arab national rights, to assert their national honour and to resist the conspiracy that threatens the future of their nation.

4. Through this agreement Sadat is realizing the long-standing goals that American imperialism has been trying unsuccessfully to achieve since the days of the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Plan, the 1956 aggression and the 1967 aggression. He is declaring that he is ready to join an Egyptian-Israeli-American pact aimed at subjecting the whole area to American hegemony and at liquidating the positions of the movement of liberation and progress of our nation and of all struggling peoples in Africa and the Middle

¹ Issued by the Palestinian news agency Wafa on September 18, 1978 — Ed.
East in general.

5. By signing this agreement Sadat's regime is giving his sanction to the well-known goal of imperialism and Zionism—that of completely isolating Egypt from the Arab national struggle and striking at all the Arab resolutions issued by the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences, the resolutions of the international community as declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Conferences of the Non-Aligned Nations and the African, Islamic and friendly countries.

6. Sadat's plan for self-government [on the West Bank and Gaza Strip] gives sanction to the Zionist enemy's aim of turning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into a colony subject to perpetual occupation. He is also trying to bring in Jordan as a party to this scheme and as a security arm of repression to be used against the Palestinian people, with the object of perpetuating this occupation.

The Camp David agreement provides clear evidence of Sadat's surrender to the position of the Zionist enemy on Jerusalem and his compliance with the enemy's plan to annex it completely. The talk of suspending the building of new settlements is no more than a fraudulent manoeuvre aimed at consolidating the old settlements and permitting the implementation of Begin's plan to expand these settlements and increase the number of their inhabitants in the next five years in preparation for imposing a fait accompli and continuing the occupation.

7. The PLO affirms our people's determination to confront and frustrate this conspiracy. Our people, who are now united under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative, once again affirm that they cannot bargain over or come to terms with any liquidationist proposal such as the self-government project or any other plan directed against their established and unshakable right to full national independence and to return to their homeland and build their independent state. Four million Palestinians, and along with them all nationalist and honourable Arab forces, cannot accept that the destiny of the Palestinian people and the cause of the Arab nation should be settled within the framework of the Camp David treason. Sadat and his allies cannot impose their will on our great people and our intrepid nation.

While announcing its total rejection of the results and agreements of Camp David, the PLO calls on the masses of the Palestinian people to declare their anger with and resolute resistance to this conspiracy. We call on our people in the occupied territory and those of the diaspora, wherever they live, to call a general strike on September 20, 1978 in expression of their inflexible will and their support for their revolution. We call on them to organize popular marches and demonstrations against the conspiracy and its advocates and the forces that are in collusion with it.

The Palestinian revolution warns all suspect quarters that try to build a place for themselves in the self-government conspiracy and declare their support for the Camp David conspiracy that they will have to face the will of our people and their just penalty.

In this grave situation nationalist Arab forces and governments are called on to pursue a serious and resolute policy of confronting the conspiracy. This can only be achieved by the coordination and unification of the military, economic and political resources and the capabilities of the Arab masses in order to protect the Arab liberation movement from the scheme that this hostile alliance is devising to strike at and liquidate it. We affirm that, at its next conference, the Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation will have a great responsibility to shoulder in this matter and will have to face a serious test before the Palestinian and Arab masses.
The Palestinian revolution calls attention to the dangers of the Zionist-isolationist plan in Lebanon, which will try to exploit the results of the liquidationist agreement at Camp David to escalate its aggression against the Lebanese nationalist forces, the Palestinian revolution and Syria. This requires that the unity and solidarity of all the parties opposed to this plan be intensified to a greater extent than ever before. It also requires that all resources be coordinated and integrated to enable the people of Lebanon to defeat this scheme which is directed against their destiny and that of their country as a whole.

The coming stage will be fraught with the gravest dangers for the future of the whole of this area, its peoples and its liberation movement. The Palestinian revolution, which has honourably and intrepidly shouldered its responsibilities, calls on all forces concerned for the future and the national honour of this nation to rise up and resist the conspiracy to appropriate their soil and all that is sacred to them, and to confront it ceaselessly until the scheme of the US, Zionism and Sadat is utterly routed.

2

STATEMENT BY THE SAUDI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, ISSUED IN RIYADH, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978.

The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has studied with close attention the results of the Camp David conference. It has also carefully followed world and Arab reactions to these results, which have ranged from support to rejection. In the light of its unswerving Islamic and Arab principles, and in conformity with its commitments to the resolutions of the Arab summits, especially the summit conferences of Algiers and Rabat, the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wishes to make clear to Arab public opinion its attitude to current events, which is as follows:

1. The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while appreciating the efforts made by President Jimmy Carter before and during the conference, believes that the conclusions reached at the Camp David conference cannot be regarded as an acceptable final formula for peace. For the conference did not unequivocally state Israel’s determination to withdraw from all the territories it occupied by force, and first and foremost Jerusalem. It also did not mention the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to establish their state on the soil of their homeland, and it ignored the role of the PLO which the Arab summit conferences have stated is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people whom Israel evicted from their homeland.

2. The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in spite of its reservations, mentioned above, regarding the results of the Camp David conference, does not feel that it is entitled to interfere in the private affairs of any Arab country or to dispute its right to recover its occupied territories, either through armed struggle or by peaceful efforts, so long as these efforts are not incompatible with higher Arab interests.

3. The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that the present critical situation in which the Arab nation finds itself requires, more than ever before, that it be unanimous and adopt a collective Arab attitude so that it may achieve its higher goals. It is for God to realize the aspirations of the Islamic and Arab nation, to guide its steps and to ordain whether it shall win glory and victory.

1 Published in the Saudi daily al-Riyadh, September 20, 1978 – Ed.
STATEMENT BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, ISSUED IN AMMAN, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978.¹

The government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has conducted a preliminary study of the available documents resulting from and issued by the Camp David conference.

The Jordanian government, which was not a party to this conference, wishes to reiterate the principles that will govern Jordan's attitude in appraising the full results of the Camp David conference and in taking the steps and attitudes required.

1. Jordan, which is mentioned in numerous passages in the Camp David documents, has no legal or moral commitments vis-à-vis issues it has played no part in discussing, formulating or approving.

2. Jordan believes in a just and comprehensive solution that deals with all aspects of the cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict deriving from it. It believes that if any Arab party dissociates itself from the responsibility for collective action to achieve a comprehensive solution, which includes the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people over the Palestinian territory and Arab rights in full on all fronts, this can only weaken the Arab position and diminish the chances of reaching the desired just and comprehensive solution.

3. Any final settlement must include Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, including Gaza and the West Bank, and in particular the restoration of Arab sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem which was occupied along with the other Arab territories in June 1967. Similarly any just final settlement must clearly stipulate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in full freedom and within the framework of a comprehensive peaceful settlement that achieves security and peace for all parties.

4. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, believing the Palestinian people to be the first and essential party in the final settlement of the Palestinian question, will never hesitate to exercise its responsibility and to perform its role vis-à-vis the issue of peace in the area and the protection and defence of the rights of the Palestinian people. In conformity with this unswerving policy it will make extensive and comprehensive contacts at the Arab and foreign levels with a view to discovering facts and positions and appraising the situation, as a prelude to deciding on the best ways and means of serving the Palestinian cause, Arab rights and the issue of a just peace in the coming stages, within the framework of the principles to which Jordan and its people are committed.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER SALIM AL-HOSS CONCERNING THE CAMP DAVID RESULTS, BEIRUT, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978.²

Lebanon's position in the Middle East crisis has always been and still is based on her commitment to the principle of maintaining Arab solidarity, especially with respect to the agreement that is essential to ensure full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in their land.

Today, when we examine the results of the Camp David conference, we are confronted with a number of questions: What gains have the Arabs been able to

¹ Published in the Amman daily al-Rai, September 20, 1978 - Ed.
² Published in the Beirut daily al-Safir, September 20, 1978 - Ed.
achieve in the past, or can they achieve now, outside the framework of Arab solidarity? What effect could the results of the conference have on Arab solidarity now or in the foreseeable future, especially as these results in practice ignore fundamental forces concerned by the Middle East conflict? What benefit can the Arab world, including Lebanon, reap from the results of the conference, when this conference did not turn its attention to the problem of a people — the Palestinian people — who have been evicted from their homeland and who will never accept any substitute for their return to their land and their country?

We have always advocated solidarity between the Lebanese so as to protect ourselves from the negative aspects of possible external developments related to the Middle East crisis. But today we are in greater need than ever of such solidarity to confront all possible developments in the Middle East after the conference. Lebanon will certainly continue her Arab and international contacts with a view to appraising the results and reactions and taking the necessary steps and stands.

5

SPEECH BY SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASSAD TO THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE ARAB FRONT FOR STEADFASTNESS AND CONFRONTATION, DAMASCUS, SEPTEMBER 20, 1978. [EXCERPTS]

Certainly, brothers, the tribulation that faces us at present is a tribulation in the full sense of the word. Egypt has left the Arab trench, and the enemies of the Arabs cannot hope to win a greater victory than this.

In the past President Anwar Sadat affirmed his insistence on the total liberation of all the occupied Arab territories; he affirmed and reaffirmed to all the Arabs that he could not accept or even think of any separate solution; in the past he stressed that he would never agree to recognize Israel and that this was a matter for future generations.

This is what we used to hear in the recent and more distant past. But what has happened? How could he sign a separate peace and turn his back on the Arabs and the Arab history of Egypt? How could he abandon Jerusalem, the cynosure of all Arabs and Muslims?

Recently we heard him saying in the message he addressed to the people of Egypt that Jerusalem was not on the agenda of the Camp David meeting.

How could he abandon the Palestinian cause, he who for months and years kept on repeating that the Palestine issue was the kernel of the problem, as I just said, and now, by some miraculous power, he makes the kernel of the problem no more than the mere husk. He cooperates with Israel in planning and manufacturing the hammers which they think necessary and capable of smashing and crushing this husk. If this is not the case, why the joint committees, first Egyptian-Israeli, then Egyptian-Israeli-Jordanian? And Jordan did not take part in the negotiations, nor was it consulted on the formation of these committees. They have put Jordan on these committees and worked out obligations for it: the protection of travellers along the Sinai-Eilat-Jordan road that they intend to build, the participation in certain security arrangements, and other matters we have learned of from the Camp David documents. For, within the framework of their goals, they have conceived and outlined a role for Jordan, ignoring Jordan’s views, its positions and its national and all-Arab

1 Published in the Damascus daily al-Baatb, September 21, 1978 — Ed.
aspirations. But yesterday we heard Jordan's views and attitude in the statement issued in the name of the Jordanian government after the meeting of the Jordanian cabinet chaired by King Hussein.

Not long ago Anwar Sadat and I planned the October War against Israel for our Arab rights. He said of us at the time that we were the most honourable of fighters and now he has left the most honourable of fighters alone in their trenches. I wonder if Sadat's activities, under the auspices of his friendship with Menahem Begin whom he is always extolling — I wonder if his activities under the auspices of this friendship will be restricted to building and strengthening economic, cultural, touristic, diplomatic and other cooperation with Israel, as provided for by the documents. Or will he go further? Is it conceivable that with the passage of time Sadat might participate in the planning of an offensive operation against Syria with Menahem Begin?

I know, and we all know, how painful and grievous it is to hear such words. But is this unlikely? Is it impossible, after what has happened?

I repeat, we should not dwell too long on the past, nor weep over it. We must look to the future and plan for that future, so that we may remain faithful to the cause of our nation, the aspirations of our nation, the pride of our nation, so that we may affirm the fact that what is impossible is that surrender should prevail over the desire for peace, that the defeatism of individuals should prevail over peoples' will to struggle.

As we always say, peoples are put to the test by tribulations, and the Arab people are capable of overcoming this tribulation that now besets us.

Once again, I welcome you, and I hope that our conference may lead to the results we aspire to, results that will satisfy us and the citizens of our countries and of all other Arab countries whose eyes are upon us.

6

STATEMENT BY THE KUWAITI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, ISSUED IN KUWAIT, SEPTEMBER 20, 1978.¹

The Council of Ministers has studied the agreements reached by the parties that attended the Camp David conference, and has discussed the effect of these agreements on the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences and those of the United Nations regarding full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including recognition of their right to self-determination.

The Council also reaffirmed Kuwait's previous attitude of commitment to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, and in particular those of the Rabat conference, and its total conviction that the achievement of a just and permanent peace in the area requires full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and Jerusalem, and the recovery by the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO, of all their legitimate national rights.

The government will continue to observe and follow up developments in the situation in the area. The Council believes that sincere Arab solidarity within the framework of a single agreed strategy is the only way to recover Arab rights and to confront the danger that threatens us all.

¹ Published in the Kuwait daily al-Siyasa, September 21, 1978 — Ed.
7
STATEMENT BY THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, ISSUED IN TUNIS, SEPTEMBER 21, 1978.1

The Tunisian government has followed with close attention the talks that took place at Camp David, and believes it to be its duty to recall the principles which form the basis of Tunisia's attitude to the Palestine question and the problems of the Middle East:

1. Respect for international legality embodied in the United Nations resolution of 1947, which provides for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Here it is to be observed that Tunisia was the first country to call for adherence to this principle in dealing with the Palestine question.

2. Respect for that legality which rejects taking possession of the territory of others by force.

3. Respect for the unanimous decision of the Rabat summit conference to the effect that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Tunisian government believes that the results of the Camp David talks are not in accord with these principles and do not solve the fundamental problem: that of enabling the Palestinian people to determine their own future and to establish an independent state.

Nor do these results respond to the demands of the Islamic peoples in general, or the Palestinian people in particular, as regards the question of Jerusalem.

Although the Tunisian government appreciates all efforts to mitigate the present crisis in the Middle East and to avoid all developments that could endanger world peace, the Tunisian government believes that this crisis can only be satisfactorily solved if it is dealt with as a whole through the solving of all its problems, and first and foremost the question of the Palestinian people.

For all these reasons the Tunisian government believes that the results of the Camp David summit do not ensure the restoration of peace and stability to the area.

In this critical situation the Tunisian government calls on all the Arab countries to devote their attention to the Palestine question and to avoid everything that could disunite Arab ranks.

8
STATEMENT BY MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER MUHAMMAD BUSITTA, RABAT, SEPTEMBER 23, 1978.2

President Sadat's visit to Morocco can be seen as lying within the framework of the Egyptian President's wish to explain the results of Camp David, starting with Morocco, which has shared through the blood of its martyrs in liberating Arab territory, and which played host to the seventh Arab summit conference in 1974 which issued the Rabat resolutions.

Firstly, the firm fraternal relations that link the Moroccan and Egyptian peoples are deeply rooted, and we must always strive to promote them.

Secondly, Morocco has its position on the Arab cause, the Middle East problem and the Palestine problem in particular, and believes that she has the prime responsibility for ensuring that the resolutions of the latest conference remain valid and in force. This was the 1974 Rabat conference and its unambiguous resolutions which mean that there can be no solution in the Arab East

1 The text as released by the Tunisian Embassy in Beirut — Ed.
2 The text as released by the Moroccan Embassy in Beirut — Ed.
without Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem.

The problem of Palestine is the essential problem, and there can be no solution in the area unless it is taken into account. The Palestinians must establish a state on their usurped soil and enjoy their right to self-determination; they are represented by the PLO, which is the legitimate representative of this people.

Thirdly, there must be a comprehensive solution of the problem and no separate solutions.

9


The conference examined developments that have taken place in the Arab and international fields since the Algiers conference, including President Anwar Sadat's on-going policy of surrender as well as the proceedings of the Camp David meeting and its consequences. The conference analysed comprehensively and at length the current situation and developments, and established the following facts:

1. President Sadat's policy and the consequences of Camp David represent a continuation of US-Israeli scheming against the Arab nation, the Palestine cause and the rights of the Palestinian people, as well as a conscious indifference to the objective facts of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This will merely result in increased tension in the area and in exposing international peace and security to the gravest danger.

2. By acting in collusion with the Zionist enemy and with imperialism at Camp David, President Sadat has conspired against the unity of the Arab cause and the foremost interests of the Arab nation. He has violated the Charter of the Arab League, the Joint Arab Defence Pact and the resolutions of Arab summit conferences in a dangerous attempt to liquidate the cause of Palestine and to undermine the political gains achieved by the Palestinian people through struggle and the blood of their martyrs.

3. By pursuing this policy, President Sadat has struck a new blow against Arab solidarity, removing Egypt from the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict and turning it into an ally of the enemy which is threatening the Arab nation and attempting to gain control over its resources and its national security.

4. President Sadat has abandoned the international concept of a just peace in the region which is based upon total withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, especially their right to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent state on their national soil, under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.

5. The agreements arrived at in Camp David are part of a comprehensive plan to entrench the influence and dominion of US imperialism and Zionism in Egypt, the Arab homeland and the African continent and to use the Egyptian regime as an instrument to attack national liberation movements.

6. The Camp David agreements represent an acceptance by President Sadat of the Zionist scheme which seeks to persist in usurping Palestinian national soil, to maintain the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a colony ruled by Zionist forces.

¹ Published in the Damascus daily Tisbrin, September 24, 1978 — Ed.
of occupation, and to annex Jerusalem so as to become the Israeli capital. President Sadat is thus squandering away the sacrifices of the people of Palestine and of the Arab nation. He is doing violence to our heritage and our sacred places. He has violated the resolutions of the Islamic Conference and of the Organization of African Unity as well as the resolutions of the Conferences of the Non-Aligned Nations and the will of the international community which call for the liberation of occupied Palestinian and Arab lands, including Jerusalem.

7. President Sadat, who signed the Camp David agreements, is not qualified to represent the will of the Palestinian people and of the Arab nation. Accordingly, the agreement reached with the Zionist enemy does not bind the Arab nation and is considered void and illegal.

8. The Camp David agreements have violated the principles of the UN Charter and of international law as well as the UN resolutions which contain a clear definition of the rights of the Palestinian people and an affirmation of the necessity of withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian and Arab lands as the two essential prerequisites for the establishment of a just peace in the region.

9. The Arab nation has announced its rejection of the agreements reached at the Camp David conference which seek to squander the cause of Palestine, the rights of its people, the Arab character of Jerusalem and Arab rights. This is another proof of the isolation of President Sadat’s regime and of his flouting of the will and consensus of the Arab nation.

Having arrived at these facts with their dangerous consequences for the Arab and international situation and for the future of the struggle against the Israeli enemy, the conference adopted a number of resolutions and measures that seek to bolster the Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and to enable that Front to face this conspiracy in which President Sadat is now implicated. Among these resolutions and measures are the following:

1. To reject and condemn the agreements of Camp David and their results and to reaffirm the determination to confront them and to work to nullify them; to continue to struggle, using all means against the Zionist enemy and imperialism.

2. To consider these capitulationist agreements illegal and void because they dissipate Arab and Palestinian rights, especially since they were signed in the shadow of forcible Zionist occupation and its persistence.

3. To announce the principles, objectives and institutions of the Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation.

4. To set down the strategy of the coming phase in accordance with the following principles:
   a) To refuse to recognize the legality of the Camp David agreements and to reject any consequences that may arise therefrom.
   b) To support the PLO, as the sole and legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.
   c) To work to mobilize the resources of the Arab nation and to achieve Arab solidarity based upon the struggle against the Zionist enemy and the Camp David results and upon confronting the present stage with all its grave threats and the considerable damage it presents to the basic objectives of the Arab nation.
   d) To warn world public opinion of the grave threat that the Camp David agreements pose to peace and security in the region and the world.
   e) To call upon the Arab states to shoulder their national responsibilities, to adopt firm policies as regards the results of the Camp David agreements, to confront the critical times ahead and to join the Steadfastness Front or to cooperate with it in order to foil the consequences of the US-Sadat-Zionist
conspiracy and to support the policy of the Steadfastness Front that aims to safeguard the national existence of the Arab nation.

5. To sever political and economic relations with the Egyptian regime, including institutions and companies, and to implement the provisions of the Arab boycott against individuals who have any dealings with the enemy.

6. To adopt practical measures to support the forces of steadfastness, of which Syria is the principal base; to strive to provide all that is required to restore strategic balance to the region now that the Egyptian regime has left the arena of conflict with the Zionist enemy.

7. To condemn the imperialist policy of the US which, in alliance with the Zionist enemy and the Sadat regime, has continued to follow a policy that is inimical to Arab rights and objectives. This has made the US an enemy which cannot be considered as a true mediator in the efforts being made to establish a just peace in the Arab region; to hold the US directly responsible for the grave consequences that have ensued or may ensue as a result of the Camp David agreements.

8. The necessity of winning the widest possible international support and aid for the just struggle of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation; to enhance cooperation with the socialist countries, and primarily the Soviet Union, in order to safeguard the independence of the Arab countries and to protect their freedom and progress as well as the gains achieved by the Arab liberation movement.

While reviewing the situation in the Arab homeland, the conference noted with deep concern the persistence of a small group in Lebanon in dealing with the Israeli enemy, disturbing security in the city of Beirut, working to rekindle the fighting, partition Lebanon and undermine the central state. The conference affirmed its support for Lebanon's unity, Arab character and national sovereignty. The conference also expressed its satisfaction with and support for the security measures that the Arab Deterrent Force has been carrying out.

The conference further expressed its support for the policy of the Syrian Arab Republic in Lebanon which seeks to confront the attempt being made to rekindle the flames of civil war as a cover-up for the conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine question, partition Lebanon, and create sectarian statelets which can act as a base of support for the US-Sadat-Israeli alliance. The conference affirmed its support for all the Lebanese forces that oppose the Israeli scheme and those who collaborate with it.

The conference is proud to salute the Arab people of Palestine in the occupied Palestinian territories as they withstand occupation and struggle for liberation. The conference affirms continued national commitment to the cause of Palestine and support for the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their inalienable national rights under the leadership of the PLO.

The conference salutes the Arab people of Egypt and proudly acclaims the heroism and the efforts of its army and people in the service of Arab causes. The conference is confident that the Arab people of Egypt, with its national awareness and its patriotism, will adopt the proper and firm attitude to the Sadat regime which is driving that people into the pitfall of subservience to imperialism and is seeking to remove it from its natural and historic place in the arena of Arab struggle against imperialism and the Zionist enemy.
ties of the Arab homeland and to foil various types of settlement that involve surrender and defeatism, thus serving the ambitions of Zionism, US imperialism and the Israeli enemy throughout the Arab homeland.

The conference expressed its confidence in the fact that the forces of peace, freedom and justice in the world will redouble their support for Syria, the Palestinian people and the Arab nation in their just and legitimate struggle.

The conference pledges to the Arab nation that it will continue on its path of struggle, steadfastness and confrontation until the national objectives of the Arab nation are achieved.

STATEMENT BY THE EGYPTIAN LEFT-WING OPPOSITION PARTY, THE NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST GROUPING, ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, ISSUED IN CAIRO, SEPTEMBER 25, 1978. [EXCERPTS]

All Egyptians are today required to take the gravest of decisions, one that will decide the destiny of Egypt and the Arab homeland for many generations to come. At the close of the Camp David conference, President Sadat signed two documents, the first called “a framework for peace in the Middle East” and the second “a framework for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.” The state information media informed the Arab people of Egypt that by signing these documents Egypt had taken a decisive step toward achieving a comprehensive and just peace, and that now there was a possibility, for the first time since the 1967 defeat, of liberating Egyptian and Arab territory and ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, by fixed deadlines.

Even though the agreement on a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel promises that Sinai shall be returned to Egypt — and this is a fundamental demand on the part of all nationalist forces — in fact Israel’s evacuation of Egyptian territory is linked to conditions that give rise to grave misgivings, as they are prejudicial to Egypt’s national interests and sovereignty. Again, the document known as the “framework for peace in the Middle East” involves concessions it is impossible to ignore, both as regards the Palestine question — which is the crux and essence of the conflict — and as regards the all-Arab dimensions of the conflict in general. These concessions make the goal of peace more remote rather than closer, and are likely to heighten rather than diminish the explosiveness of the area.

1. The agreement does not ensure the restoration of Egypt’s full sovereignty.

The point stressed by the official information media is that the Camp David agreements ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt’s historical frontiers in Sinai, so that Egypt will recover full sovereignty over all her territory. But this conclusion is not in conformity with the facts, for several reasons, including the following:

1. As regards security guarantees:

If we accept that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai must be accompanied by security guarantees, there ought to be such guarantees for both sides, otherwise the security of one party will be ensured at the expense of the security and thereby the sovereignty of the other. The bare minimum of this condition was observed in the proposal drawn up by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and submitted to the Camp David meetings. That proposal stipulated the establishment of demilitarized zones and limited armaments areas on both

1 Published in the Beirut daily al-Safir, October 11 and 12, 1978 — Ed.
sides of the frontier, the stationing of UN forces on both sides of the frontier, the setting up of an early warning system on a mutual basis, restrictions on the kinds of armaments the countries party to the agreement should obtain and the systems of armaments they should employ and the adherence of all parties to the non-proliferation of nuclear arms treaty. But the Egyptian negotiator at Camp David did not adhere to these provisions. In the document issued at the close of the talks he agreed that the demilitarized zones and the early warning stations should be in the territory of Sinai only, without stipulating that they should also be in Israeli territory. He also agreed to the stationing of United Nations forces in Sinai, while only UN observers would be stationed in Israel. The withdrawal of the United Nations forces in Sinai is not to be dependent on a sovereign Egyptian decision; these can only be withdrawn with the unanimous agreement of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This means that United Nations forces will remain in Sinai permanently and without any time limit.

The Egyptian negotiator also did not adhere to the provision on the kind of arms the countries party to the agreement should be entitled to acquire, or the systems of armaments they were to employ, although Israel’s conspicuous military superiority cannot be denied. Nor did he insist on the provision on the adherence of all parties to the non-proliferation of nuclear arms treaty, although Israel is the only one of the states party to the conflict that possesses nuclear bombs.

The infringement of the principle of equality and reciprocity as regards security guarantees becomes even more obvious when we realize that the whole of Sinai, including the parts recovered by the Egyptian army by force of arms in the glorious battles of the crossing of the Canal in 1973, will be an area of restricted armaments and Egyptian sovereignty over it will be incomplete. It has been decided that the demilitarized zone in which Egypt will not be allowed to have any military presence at all shall stretch the whole length of Sinai with a width from 20 to 40 kilometres along Egypt’s eastern international frontier. Next comes an area comprising most of the territory of Sinai as far as the passes, in which the only forces are to be three battalions of frontier guards. Finally an area fifty kilometres wide east of the canal and the Gulf of Suez is to be an area of limited armaments, where only one division may be stationed. The limited armaments measures are to apply to the Israeli side only symbolically, in a strip three kilometres wide along the frontier with Egypt: Israeli military presence of up to four battalions will be permitted in this narrow strip directly adjacent to Egyptian territory.

The agreement does not specify where in Sinai the early warning stations will be, nor who is to supervise their operation. As we know, there are already early warning stations in the area of the passes whose operation is supervised by Americans and Israelis, and also Egyptians.

The agreement stipulates that Israel give up the airfields it constructed near El Arish, Rafah, Ras al-Naqb and Sharm al-Sheikh, and that these airfields be used for civilian purposes only, including their possible commercial use by all countries. All countries really means Israel, for not many countries aside from Israel will be interested in using airfields for civilian and commercial purposes that were established in the Sinai desert near the Israeli frontier. According to informed American sources, these airfields will be used to train pilots and the US has undertaken to meet the expenses of establishing two Israeli air bases in the Negev near the Egyptian frontier, at a cost of five hundred million dollars each. In this way Israel, despite giving up its airfields in
Sinai, will maintain air control over it, especially as there will be no Egyptian military airfields in Sinai at all.

It is thus clear that Egypt's military frontier will in fact be the Suez Canal, and for the first time in history she will have a military frontier that is isolated and remote from her international political frontier. Nor is this situation temporary, with a time limit; it is permanent, though, according to the same agreement, this will not apply to Israel. It therefore involves an infringement of Egypt's security in the interests of Israel's. It infringes Egypt's sovereignty and is in fact the application of Carter's idea that Israel should have two kinds of frontiers: political frontiers and separate defensible military frontiers, the latter stretching into the territory of the neighbouring Arab countries.

2. Deadlines in the agreement:

The Egyptian government is to sign a peace treaty with Israel within three months, whereas Israel has up to three years in which to withdraw all its forces from Egyptian territory.

The Israeli forces are to evacuate Sinai territory in two stages. In the first stage, that is, within three to nine months from the signing of the treaty, withdrawal will be to a line running from El Arish in the north to Ras Muhammad in the south. Following the completion of the first stage of withdrawal Egypt is committed to establish normal relations with Israel, i.e. full recognition, which includes diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, the ending of the economic boycott and the removal of restrictions on the movement of goods and persons, and mutual protection of citizens in conformity with the law.

This means that relations between Egypt and Israel will be completely normalized, and that an Israeli embassy will be opened in Cairo possibly more than two years before Israeli forces have evacuated all the territory of Sinai.

It will be recalled that up to the middle of 1977, President Sadat repeatedly declared that the normalization of relations with Israel and the exchange of diplomatic representatives were absolutely out of the question, and could not take place for at least another generation, that is, until the bitterness and hatred of thirty years of disasters and wars had been buried. Indeed, international regulations for the establishment of peace stipulate the prevention of wars and respect for frontiers, but not the establishment of diplomatic, cultural or economic relations, which are the absolute prerogative of sovereignty. Later President Sadat, in the presence of the American President Carter and in response to his urging, agreed that the normalization of relations with Israel could be considered, but not before five years after the evacuation by Israeli forces of all the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the people of Palestine.

President Sadat's initiative in visiting Jerusalem on November 19, 1977 represented a fundamental change, for those direct dealings with the Israeli leaders in Israeli territory showed that some kind of normalization of relations was on the cards regardless of how much progress had been made in peace negotiations. And now this idea is firmly established by the Egyptian government through the Camp David agreements. For the Egyptian negotiator undertook to sign a peace treaty with Israel before withdrawal operations start, and to establish diplomatic relations with Israel while part of Egyptian territory is still under occupation, not to mention the other occupied Arab territories and the rights of the people of Palestine.

Under an "Egyptian-Israeli" peace treaty of this kind, Egypt will be able to sever her political, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with any country in the world except Israel, since this would
involve the abrogation of the peace treaty.

The idea is that Egypt shall be under a diplomatic obligation to congratulate Israel on her National Day — the anniversary of the founding of Israel on May 15 of every year, even the years when Israel is still occupying Egyptian territory — at a time when Egypt's diplomatic relations with five Arab countries are still severed. Such obligations are certainly a humiliating blow to Egypt's national honour, in addition to the fact that they impair Egyptian sovereignty.

3. The right of passage through Egyptian territory acquired by Israel:

The Camp David agreement provides for the free passage of Israeli ships through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal and regards the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Aqaba as international waterways open to all countries for free navigation, free land passage and free overflight. It also provides for the building of a fast road linking Sinai with Jordan near Eilat, with free peaceful passage guaranteed for Egypt and Jordan.

Admittedly freedom of passage through the Suez Canal is guaranteed by an international agreement, the Constantinople Agreement of 1889. But to have the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba regarded as open international waterways is a new right acquired by Israel, at least as regards the localities where this right conflicts with Egypt's sovereignty over her territorial waters.

More important than this, however, is the agreement's provision for the building of a fast road linking Sinai with Jordan near Eilat, with guaranteed free peaceful passage for Egypt and Jordan. It may be argued that this provision is the response to an Egyptian request for a link with the Arab East. But none of the three Camp David parties is entitled to speak on behalf of Jordan. Therefore the obligation established by this provision is for

the construction of a fast road linking Eilat with the Suez Canal, by way of the Mitla Pass. There are indications that such a road would be of practical benefit to Israel in the economic, commercial and tourist sectors but to what extent would Egypt's industry, commerce or tourism really benefit from this road? We should also like to question the significance of this road's passing through the Mitla Pass, whose military and strategic importance for the defence of Egypt is well known.

4. The implications of the normalization of relations for Egyptian sovereignty:

a) Political

The signing of the peace treaty will be a violation of the Joint Arab Defence Agreement — the basis of Arab military solidarity — which rests on the assumption that the common enemy is Israel. To sign this treaty separately in the face of the opposition of the other Arab countries means throwing over this agreement, the basic principles of the Arab League and all forms of joint Arab action. And this involves a radical change in all dimensions of the political map of the area.

b) Economic

The economic boycott of Israel will be abolished at a time when Egypt is threatened with economic isolation from the Arabs. This means undermining the very basis of Egyptian economic growth, which cannot be achieved in isolation from Arab integration. There is no longer any chance for Egypt to continue to obtain Arab support for arming or for defence or war purposes; it will be recalled that all the Arab countries have refrained from announcing their support for the Camp David agreement, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait and the Arab Emirates.

We should recall that more than a million and a half Egyptians now work in
the Arab countries; when we remember that each of these supports an average of three persons, we can see that five million Egyptians depend for their daily bread on their income from the Arab countries, not to mention the Arab loans, investments and aid whose importance to the Egyptian economy as a whole is vital. It is not difficult to imagine the greatly increased burdens the Egyptian economy will have to bear if all, or even some, of the Arab countries enforce an economic boycott of Egypt as they do in the case of Israel.

It is also to be observed that, under the slogans of peace and normal relations and in conformity with the agreements with Egypt, Israel is hoping to play the role it has long dreamed of, the role of general agent for the multinational monopolies in the Arab homeland. Israel is trying to isolate the Egyptian economy from the Arab economy as a whole, to thwart all attempts to achieve the economic integration of the Arab countries and to turn the Arabs into mere labourers and consumers of Israeli products. Israel is trying to gain control of the Arab economy, and wants to use Egypt as a bridge thereto, relying on the unlimited support provided Israel by the international monopolies. We have to realize that, thanks to its military supremacy, organic links with the US and the Western countries, and with the support of international organizations and bodies, Israel cannot place its experience and resources at the service of Egypt and the Egyptians as some people fancy. It is much more likely and natural that Israel should use all these resources to safeguard the flow of Arab oil to the West, to ensure the continued immigration of Jews to Israel and to monopolize technological advance in the area, Egypt being used for infiltration into all parts of the Arab homeland. And it is very probable that a small local group of sycophants, owing no loyalty to their homeland and hoping to become richer through acts of plunder and robbery committed locally, will find that their interests coincide with those of Israel and the international monopolies that support it, which lie in expansion and domination.

Commenting on the Camp David agreements, Ezer Weizman quite frankly told the American television network ABC, "Israel will have to maintain a strong army until the peace process reaches a point of no return. It must also be observed that if we succeed in establishing relations with Egypt based on confidence and devoid of tension, along with economic and touristic links and freedom of passage, that will in fact amount to full control over the territories necessary for our self-defence."

5. A separate solution:
The Egyptian negotiator made one condition only for the signing of a peace treaty with Israel — the condition related to Israeli settlements in Sinai. This is a condition of fundamental importance to the territory of Egypt. The signing of the treaty was not made dependent on any other condition, either participation in the negotiations by Jordan — although the Camp David agreement maintains that it is essential that Jordan should be a party to dealing with the Palestine problem, despite its not being present — or the treatment of any other aspect of the conflict (nothing whatever has been decided as regards the problems of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights).

Moreover, as regards Egypt, the treaty is to be enforced in accordance with a time schedule completely separate from that applicable to the West Bank and Gaza. The treaty obliges Israel to withdraw completely from Egypt within three years, and the treaty also specifies three years as the maximum period within which a start must be made on dealing with the problem of the West
Bank and Gaza — that is to say, the establishment of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. This means that the problem of Egypt is to be separated from the other aspects of the conflict, including the problem of Palestine, not only as regards the commitments of the Camp David parties, but also as regards the timetable of the agreement. Thus the agreement really amounts to a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, regardless of what is conceded by the document on the general framework for peace in the Middle East.

Ultimately, this separate solution, which some Egyptians may regard as being worth the price we have paid for it on the grounds that it restores Egypt's sovereignty over Sinai, is in fact no more than a promise to return Sinai with diminished sovereignty and, indeed, it renders the whole of Egypt a state with diminished sovereignty. For as soon as it is signed it will constitute a grave restriction on future Egyptian decisions in vital fields of national activity, not to mention action at the Arab level.

II. The agreement does not outline an acceptable framework for dealing with the Palestine problem.

The general framework for peace in the Middle East has a section on "the Palestine problem" — but in fact all we find is a paragraph on "the West Bank and Gaza," and the agreement still refuses to recognize the existence of the "people of Palestine" with all the characteristics of a people independent from the Israelis. There are merely "Arab Palestinians" or "Arabs of the Land of Israel," because in Begin's view Palestine is Israel. This is made clear in President Carter's letter to Begin on the translation of the terms used in the English version of the Camp David agreements into a language acceptable to Begin.

In the light of this it was not surprising that the Camp David agreements should not concede to the Palestinian people:
- their right to sovereignty,
- their right to self-determination,
- their right to an independent state,
- their right to be represented by the PLO, which — as was decided unanimously by the Rabat Arab summit, by the masses of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory through the municipal elections, and by the UN General Assembly by an overwhelming majority — is alone qualified to speak on behalf of the people of Palestine.

In fact the agreement is very similar to President Carter's Aswan formula for the solution of the Palestine problem, which is: "the Palestinians have the right to participate in deciding their future." It also adopts from the plan that Begin put forward in Ismailia — and that Egypt rejected at the time — the following basic principles:

- The abolition of the military government at present in force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (paragraph 1 of the Begin Plan);
- The establishment of administrative autonomy in the two areas (paragraph 2: full self-government has been substituted for administrative autonomy);
- The election of an Administrative Council by the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
- The Administrative Council shall be empowered to deal with all affairs concerning the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza (paragraph 9);
- The formation of a committee including representatives of Israel, Jordan (to which Egypt has been added) and the Administrative Council to determine norms of immigration to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Conditions will also be laid down for the return of Arab refugees living outside these two areas, as long as they are in reasonable numbers. Decisions of this committee shall be unanimous (paragraph 21, which has been...
slightly amended);
— Israel will stand by her right to and claim of sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in the light of this demand she proposes, in order to protect the agreement and peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas should be left open (paragraph 24);
— These principles will be subject to review after a five-year period.

The agreement reduces the Palestinian people to those living in the West Bank and Gaza and those who left the country after the 1967 war. It does not provide for the return of those who are known as “the Palestinian refugees.” It thus ignores the existence of nearly two million Palestinians who have been obliged to live abroad.

The agreement provides for the continued existence of Israeli protectorates in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the occupation forces being re-deployed so as to leave the task of internal security (confronting uprisings by the Palestinian people) to Egypt, Jordan and the local police force which will be formed under the supervision of Israel, Egypt and Jordan.

It has been decided that the number of Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza be reduced from eleven to seven thousand men. The agreement does not provide for the abolition of the Israeli military presence even after the five year transitional period. It is also decided that no Arab party (including the Palestinians) shall have any military presence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during and even after the transitional period.

There is no mention in the agreement of the removal of Israeli settlements in the West Bank during or after the five year transitional period. On the contrary, Begin has declared that he is committed to halting the building of new settlements for three months only: the stage of negotiations with Egypt on the signing of the peace treaty. The agreement stipulates that the negotiations shall determine “the location of the boundaries in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” and this innovative expression in fact means that the frontiers are to be completely redrawn. The plan Egypt originally submitted to the Camp David meetings specified that adjustments to the frontiers should be insignificant and should not reflect the extent of the territory occupied.

Obviously none of the three parties to the Camp David talks has the right to settle the Palestine problem in the absence of a party legitimately representing the people of Palestine; these parties decided that the solution of this problem is conditional on Jordan taking part in the negotiations, but up to now King Hussein has shown no readiness to do so. President Sadat declared in a letter to President Carter that Egypt is prepared to perform the Arab role of guaranteeing the implementation of the paragraphs on the West Bank and Gaza, but Egypt has no legal right to take over this role.

The role that Egypt is performing in this connection — and in the absence of all the other concerned Arab parties — can only provide Israel with a justification to continue to consolidate its occupation.

The agreement completely ignores the question of Jerusalem, which Israel insists should remain united as its capital.

Begin made it clear in the Knesset when the Camp David agreements were submitted that Israeli forces will continue to be stationed in the West Bank after the end of the five year period. He added that he had undertaken to freeze the settlements in the West Bank for three months only, and that there was nothing to prevent the existing settlements from being strengthened.

On Jerusalem Begin said that Israel will never agree to hand over East Jerusalem to the Arabs, and added that Jerusalem will remain united until the
end of time, as it has become the capital of Israel.

At the end of his speech to the Knesset Begin frankly declared that during the Camp David conference he had succeeded in avoiding three dangers:

1. The organization of a referendum in the West Bank on the future of these territories;
2. The establishment of a Palestinian state;
3. PLO participation in the negotiations. He described the PLO as being a barbaric Nazi organization.

The agreement has not enjoyed sufficient acceptance in the world — either in Arab, Islamic, Christian, European or international circles — for it to form the basis of even the smallest advance toward solving the Middle East crisis in all its complicated and problematic dimensions. It is unreservedly supported only by President Carter, who personally called for the Camp David meeting. It is also impossible to underestimate the significance of the fact that three Egyptian Foreign Ministers — Ismail Fahmy, Muhammad Riyadh and Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil — have resigned one after the other.

Ultimately the Camp David agreements have not succeeded in devising a framework for the peaceful, just, comprehensive and permanent solution of the Middle East crisis — the solution that the Egyptian and the Arab masses have been hoping for, and rightly; after they have suffered so long and made such overwhelming sacrifices they are entitled to hope for peace and prosperity. But the Camp David agreements will lead to the outbreak in the Arab area of racial, sectarian, tribal, national and religious controversies and strife and perhaps of internal and international wars, besides which the civil war in Lebanon will pale into insignificance. The Egyptian government's determination to implement the agreements in the face of the vehement resistance of the Arab peoples, and in particular the people of Palestine, and without consulting the Arab governments, certainly heralds such developments in the near future.

STATEMENT BY THE WEST BANK NATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH MET IN BEIT HANINA, JERUSALEM, OCTOBER 1, 1978.

On this day Sunday, October 1, 1978, in the professional unions' centre in Jerusalem, Muslim and Christian religious leaders, mayors and city council members, representatives of the unions, clubs and national institutions, and leading personalities in Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories held a national conference and studied the results of the Camp David conference, its agreements, explanations, letters and the declarations of those who signed it. All those present have unanimously decided the following:

1. To totally reject and oppose these agreements, and all the documents, explanations and annexes related to them.

2. The Camp David agreements are in contradiction to the all-Arab character of our battle, as they actually constitute a separate treaty between Egypt and Israel, which will take Egypt out of the Arab arena in order to strike at the Arab and African liberation movements.

3. The above-mentioned agreements are a clear deviation from the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences in general and the Algiers and Rabat sum-

1 Published in the PLO weekly Filastin al-Thawra, Beirut, October 9, 1978 — Ed.
mits in particular, which clearly opposed separate solutions and demanded that the confrontation forces work jointly in all fields.

4. The above-mentioned agreements contradict the UN General Assembly resolutions on the Palestinian issue and are an open defiance of the international will and an attack on the Palestinian people's natural rights.

5. The above-mentioned agreements have denied the rights of the Palestinian people and ignored their just cause, which is the crux of the conflict in the Middle East, and ignored their usurped rights and their right of self-determination on their land. The agreements have also ignored the PLO, which is the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people, and attempt to create an alternative leadership to the PLO under the auspices of occupation by establishing self-rule which time after time all sectors of our people have absolutely rejected.

6. The struggle of the Palestinian people was and still is an integral part of the struggle of the Arab peoples for freedom, unity and progress, and is part of the world liberation movement. And the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territory are a unified, inseparable whole.

7. No peace is possible in the area without the complete and genuine withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories, nor without securing for the Palestinian people the right of return, self-determination and the creation of their own independent state on their land, with Jerusalem as its capital.

8. We reject the self-government plan both in its form and content. It is a plan to consolidate the occupation, to continue the oppression of our people and the usurping of our legitimate rights. It is an open plot to bypass the ambitions of our people and our right to our own homeland and to self-determination.

9. From our beloved Jerusalem, the throbbing heart of Palestine, we appeal to our Arab people everywhere to retain their national unity, confirm their allegiance to their legitimate leadership, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and stand united in the face of all efforts to implement the proposed self-government plan and other capitulationist solutions.

On this occasion we salute our Palestinian people inside and outside [Palestine], the memory of our martyrs who sacrificed their lives for their country and the resisters in the Israeli prisons. We salute the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and the resolutions of its summits in Tripoli and Damascus. These are an extension of the Arab militant stance established by the Arab people through their struggles. And we salute all friendly nations for their clear position in support of our national rights.

[96 signatories]

STATEMENT BY THE IRAQI REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, ISSUED IN BAGHDAD, OCTOBER 1, 1978. [EXCERPTS]

Since the announcement of the outcome of the Camp David conference, the Arab masses have been filled with profound alarm as regards their present and their future, because of the gravity of the criminal and treasonable conspiracy that the conference has disclosed. The Revolution Command Council has, both at meetings on its own and at joint meetings with the Regional and National Commands of the [Baath] Party, followed the course of events and of reactions in the Arab homeland. The Arab masses everywhere have indeed expressed the
pain they feel and their condemnation of this treasonable conspiracy, yet official and popular attitudes to these dangerous and treasonable agreements have not risen to the historic level of resolute rejection of this dangerous conspiracy, which prejudices the destiny, the rights and the honour of the Arab nation.

After exhaustive study of Arab and international potentialities and circumstances, and guided by the instructions of the National and Regional Commands of the Party, the Revolution Command Council resolves the following:

1. To regard Iraq, as it has always been, as part of the northern military front in confrontation of the Zionist enemy and of any front adjacent to the Zionist entity that could be activated against the enemy in the future. Iraq declares her readiness to send effective military forces to the Syrian arena immediately to ensure that there is an Arab force capable of confronting the enemy and thwarting the schemes of colonialism and Zionism that are aimed at bringing the Arab nation to its knees and securing the acceptance of solutions and settlements offensive to its honour and prejudicial of its historic rights. We call on the Syrian government to respond fully to this historic national step and to take the necessary measures to facilitate the stationing of units of the Iraqi army on the advanced lines of the front with the enemy.

2. So grave are the dangers that will result from Egypt's abandoning the Arab-Zionist conflict, should the Camp David agreements be implemented, that all Arab governments are required to take a serious and responsible stand to prevent these agreements being implemented. Iraq calls for consultations with a view to convening an Arab summit conference to study the Arab situation and to reach agreement on serious joint Arab steps to prevent any Arab party accepting any solution prejudicial to rights and issues of national destiny and exposing the Arab nation to the dangers of division and disruption. Iraq is ready to act as host to this conference.

3. Iraq appreciates the suffocating economic situation that has beset Egypt for many years, recognizing that should the Arabs succeed in preventing the implementation of the Camp David agreements and in bringing Egypt back into the fold of joint Arab action, financial burdens will fall to Egypt's lot that she is incapable of bearing alone. But should the Egyptian government be prepared to abandon the Camp David agreements, Iraq calls on the wealthier Arab countries to establish a national fund to aid Egypt and to meet her financial requirements. [This fund] should also meet the financial requirements of the western, northern and eastern confrontation fronts and those of the PLO and ensure the steadfastness of the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied territory. The fund shall be established in conformity with an agreement to be signed by and adhered to by the parties concerned and under the auspices of the whole Arab community of nations. Iraq proposes that the allocations to this fund should be not less than nine billion dollars per year, for ten years, which total could be increased in the light of the requirements of the battle.

Five billion dollars of this fund should be allocated as annual aid to Egypt, and the remainder to the confrontation fronts to cover military requirements in the field of steadfastness and liberation.

---

INTERVIEW WITH KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON THE CBS TELEVISION PROGRAMME "FACE THE NATION,"
[In reply to a question on the clarifications Jordan expects from the US regarding the Camp David agreements.]

King Hussein: Some of the questions that we are posing are the following. Does the United States intend to play the role of a full partner in any negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza, and of the Palestinian question in general? At what stage of the negotiations will the United States participate, and what role will it play?

We are wondering why the period of five years has been chosen for the transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza? ...

What is the geographical definition of the West Bank in the view of the United States government? Are Arab Jerusalem and the surrounding Arab areas incorporated into Israel after the 1967 war included in the American definition of the West Bank? As you know, so-called Greater Jerusalem now constitutes one-fifth of the occupied West Bank. What would be the status of the West Bank and of Gaza from the point of view of sovereignty at the end of the five years of transitional arrangements? There is a clear reference to sovereignty in the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, but this is unclear in terms of the framework for the rest of the occupied territories. Will any Israeli forces remain in any part of the West Bank and of Gaza after the transitional period? If so, by what right and with what justification?

During the transitional period of self-government in the West Bank and Gaza, what higher authority would supervise the self-governing authority? Would it be a United Nations or a similar neutral international supervisory authority? What sources would provide the budgetary needs of the self-governing authority? What would determine the limitations on its powers?

And, where the document refers to the self-governing authority which is to be constituted in the West Bank and Gaza areas, does the jurisdiction of this authority extend to the part of Jerusalem which had been part of the West Bank when it fell under occupation in 1967, as well as to other annexed areas around it, both in terms of territory and people?

At the end of the transitional period, what would be the status of Arab Jerusalem?

What would happen to the numerous Israeli settlements — and they extend throughout the area — in the occupied areas during and after the transitional period? What will Israel's obligation be during the coming period, until the end of the transitional period, regarding the policy of settlements? Will the Israeli citizens who reside at present in the settlements be eligible for participation in the establishment of the self-governing authority and its subsequent activities? What will be the status of the Israeli citizens residing in the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period? And will there be any, and if so, what would their status be after the end of the transitional period?

At the end of the transitional period, will the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza exercise in freedom the right of self-determination in order to decide their political future?

What solution does the framework agreement envisage for the problem of the Palestinians living outside the occupied areas as refugees, and for the restoration of their rights?

What is the definition of Palestinians?

What does the framework agreement envisage for the future of the rest of the occupied Arab territories?

1 Text as published by the Amman daily al-Rai, October 2, 1978 — Ed.
In the definition of the security requirements in the area, does the United States government endorse the principle of reciprocity on these requirements, or does the United States government regard these requirements to be one-sided only?

And as Security Council resolution 242 is stated to be the basis of any negotiations for the settlement of the West Bank, Gaza and other aspects of the conflict, what would the US government do in the event of conflicting interpretations between the negotiating parties — particularly in view of the US government's previous interpretation of Security Council resolution 242 and commitments based thereon, which were the basis of acceptance by Jordan of the said resolution?

The Soviet side expressed the highest appreciation for the results of the Damascus conference, which made a major contribution to reinforcing the solidarity and unity of action of the progressive Arab countries and the PLO in the struggle against the machinations of imperialism and anti-Arab separate deals. It also expressed its solidarity with the Arab countries and the Arab nation, which reject attempts to win them over to supporting the deal that was worked out at Camp David, and attention was drawn to the extreme urgency, in present circumstances, of the task of uniting and activating all forces which are opposed to the capitulationist line in Middle East problems and which demand real peace for its peoples.

The two sides agreed that the agreements concluded at Camp David between Egypt and Israel, with the active participation of the US, amount to an act of collusion which has taken place behind the backs of the Arabs and against their interests and which is fundamentally hostile to them. They believe that the deal concluded at Camp David means, in brief, that a comprehensive and just solution of the Middle East problem has been abandoned in favour of partial settlements that will enable Israel to hold on to the occupied Arab territories and prevent the Palestinian Arab people from obtaining their established rights. Thus another attempt has been made to disunite Arab ranks, to sow dissension among the Arabs and to impose on the Arab countries the settlement terms that suit the aggressor and the forces that support him, which can only increase the danger of an explosion in the Middle East.

Syria and the USSR resolutely condemn the actions of the Egyptian regime that are gravely prejudicing the struggle of the Arab and African peoples

1 Published in the Damascus daily Tishrin, October 7, 1978 — Ed.
to achieve national liberation and to consolidate their independence.

The two sides are firmly convinced that the method of separate deals that is being pursued behind the scenes does not bring the achievement of peace in this area any closer; on the contrary it renders it more remote and impedes it.

The two sides devoted special attention to the connection between the policy of separate deals and the efforts of imperialist circles to expand their positions in the Middle East, especially in the military field.

The leaders of Syria and the USSR affirmed the intention of their two countries to continue their joint struggle to establish a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

They also expressed their conviction that the only way to achieve this goal is through the full withdrawal of Israel's forces from all the Arab territories it occupied in 1967 and the enforcement of the established national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to self-determination and to establish their independent state, and the Palestinians' right to return to their homes in conformity with United Nations resolutions.

The two sides believe that such a solution requires joint efforts by all the parties concerned, including the PLO, which is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within the framework of an international institution that was especially established with a view to establishing peace in the Middle East: the Geneva Conference.

The two sides stressed the importance of strengthening Arab friendship with the USSR and the other countries of the socialist camp by all available means, in the interests of safeguarding the independence and security of the Arab countries, developing their national economies and promoting their prosperity, and announced that they will resist all future attempts to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship.

RESOLUTIONS PASSED AT THE GAZA NATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH MET AT GAZA, OCTOBER 16 AND 18, 1978.1

On October 16 and 18, 1978, the municipalities, rural councils, benevolent societies, trade associations, chambers of commerce and industry and business establishments of the Gaza Strip met to discuss the contents of the Camp David agreements and the documents appended thereto.

In affirming the concern of the Palestinian Arab people of the Gaza Strip that a just peace should prevail in the Middle East, and in desiring that all causes and consequences of wars should disappear so that all peoples of the region can live in a permanent peace which will come about by fulfilling the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people, they set forth their views, in a positive, constructive and objective spirit:

1. The Camp David agreement ignores the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, their right to freedom and self-determination and their right to create an independent national state in their homeland. The agreement also violates the UN Charter, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the provisions of international law.

2. The Camp David agreement violates the consensus of Arab states arrived at in the various Arab summit meetings, especially the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summits.

1 Published in the Arabic-language newspaper of the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah), al-Ittibad, Haifa, October 24, 1978 — Ed.
3. The Camp David agreement violates UN General Assembly resolutions, especially resolution 3236 of November 22, 1974 and resolution 3375 of November 10, 1975.

4. The agreement entrenches Israeli occupation for an unlimited period of time, endows it with legality, disrupts the unity of the Palestinian people at home and abroad, creates a new situation and new facts that essentially and basically conflict with the interests of the Palestinian Arab people and, in addition, does not specify the removal of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

5. The agreement ignored the future of Arab Jerusalem. This deliberate oversight represents a grave danger to its Muslim and Christian shrines and to the rights of its Palestinian Arab population.

6. A just solution to the Palestinian question can only be achieved when the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their soil and homeland and to the exercise of their natural right to freedom, justice and self-determination are respected and when the Israeli forces have completely and immediately withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories.

7. The participants affirm that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people and that its participation on an equal footing with all other sides is essential for the achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian question. The cause of peace in the Middle East is not served by deliberately ignoring the PLO.

8. Self-government according to the Camp David agreement is without content or meaning since it does not fulfil even the minimum demands and rights of the Palestinian Arab people, nor does it represent the correct manner in which that people can exercise their right to freedom and self-determination. This is because it is obscure, ambiguous and complex and lacks specific and genuine guarantees which ensure for that people their freedom, their return and self-determination on their soil and in their homeland.

9. Accordingly, the participants condemn the Camp David agreement and call upon all who love justice and peace in the world, upon the Arab and Islamic worlds, upon world public opinion and the United Nations to help the Palestinian Arab people obtain their just rights and put an end to their continuing tragedy. The participants affirm that they fully support a just peace. They assert that the Palestinian Arab people aspire to that just peace. Of all nations in the world, they need and desire this most in order to be rid of their sufferings and of the cruel fate imposed upon them against their will. They affirm that they have always been the victim of continuous wars and have been denied their natural right to freedom and a life of dignity on their own soil and in their homeland.

16 IRAQI-SYRIAN CHARTER FOR JOINT NATIONAL ACTION AGREED ON BY SYRIAN PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASSAD AND IRAQI PRESIDENT AHMAD HASSAN AL-BAKR FOLLOWING THEIR MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD, OCTOBER 24-26, 1978. [EXCERPTS]

In response to the historic national responsibility shouldered by the leadership of the two Arab regions, Iraq and Syria; in conformity with their deep faith in the principles of Arab nationalism and Arab unity; cognizant of the great dangers that threaten the Arab nation and which are at present posed by the imperialist-Zionist alliance that has increased in gravity with the signing of reasonable agreements between the Egyptian regime and the Zionist enemy;

---

1 Published in the Damascus daily Tisbrin, October 27, 1978 – Ed.
realizing the necessity of furnishing what is required of them in the way of effective struggle in order to confront these dangers that threaten the destiny, dignity, sovereignty and future of the Arab nation; determined to achieve a qualitative change in relations between the two fraternal regions, the leaderships of the two regions met in Baghdad between October 24-26, 1978, in an atmosphere characterized by a deep consciousness of historic responsibility, profound accord and full determination to fulfil the national aspirations of the Arab masses. The two leaderships agreed upon a charter for joint national action between the two regions covering the various political, military, economic, cultural, informational and other fields. The charter also includes a determination to work hard and according to an on-going scientific plan in order to achieve the closest form of unitary relations between the two Arab regions, Iraq and Syria.

The resolutions adopted by the two leaderships in their historic meeting in October 1978 constitute an important qualitative turning point in relations between the two regions on the road to Arab unity, the noblest objective of the Arab masses.

The two leaderships emphasize in particular the deep combative and comprehensive significance of their historic agreement as regards the just struggle that the Arab nation is waging against the usurping Zionist enemy for the sake of liberating the land and of recovering the legitimate rights of the Arab nation.

The two delegations have decided upon the following:

I. To create a Joint Higher Political Commission composed of the leaderships of the two regions which would supervise all questions of bilateral affairs between the two regions in the political, military, economic, cultural, educational, informational and other fields, and which would achieve coordination and complementarity between them, in the direction of the unionist objectives defined by this charter.

II. The Commission shall be composed of:

**Iraqi Side**

1. President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, Chairman of the Revolution Command Council-President of the Republic,
2. Mr. Saddam Hussein, Vice-Chairman of the RCC,
3. Mr. 'Izzat Ibrahim, Member of the RCC and Minister of the Interior,
4. Mr. Taha Yasin Ramadan, Member of the RCC and Minister of Housing and Reconstruction,
5. Mr. Tariq 'Aziz, Member of the RCC,
6. Mr. 'Adnan Hussein, Member of the RCC and Minister of Planning,
7. Airforce General 'Adnan Khairallah, Member of the RCC and Minister of Defence.

**Syrian Side**

1. President Hafiz al-Assad, President of the Republic,
2. Mr. Muhammad 'Ali al-Halabi, Prime Minister,
3. Mr. 'Abdul-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
4. Mr. Jamil Shayya, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs,
5. Mr. Fahmi al-Yusufi, Deputy Prime Minister for Services,
6. General Mustafa Tlas, Minister of Defence,
7. Mr. Zuhair Masharqa, Minister of Education.

III. The Commission shall meet regularly every three months, or whenever necessary, in each capital by turn.

IV. The Commission shall create a number of central committees in the
following manner:

1. The Committee for Political, Informational and Cultural Affairs, headed on the Iraqi side by Mr. Tariq 'Aziz, Member of the RCC, and on the Syrian side by Mr. 'Abdul-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

The Committee shall propose common policies and supervise the achievement of coordination, complementarity and cooperation between the two regions in the political, informational and cultural fields.

2. The Committee for Economic Affairs and Technical Cooperation, headed on the Iraqi side by Mr. 'Adnan Hussein, Member of the RCC and Minister of Planning, and on the Syrian side by Mr. Jamil Shayya, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs.

The Committee shall undertake to achieve coordination, complementarity and cooperation between the two regions in all economic and technical fields and to enhance and develop relations in the fields of agriculture, industry, irrigation, commerce, planning, transport and all other economic and technical fields.

3. The Committee for Military Cooperation shall be composed, on the Iraqi side, of
   a) Airforce General 'Adnan Khairallah, Minister of Defence,
   b) Dr. Sa'dun Hamadi, Foreign Minister,
   c) General 'Abdul-Jabbar Shanshal, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and, on the Syrian side, by
   a) Mr. 'Abdul-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
   b) General Mustafa Tlas, Minister of Defence,
   c) General Hikmat Shihabi, Chief of Staff of the Army and Armed Forces.

The Committee shall prepare a draft agreement for joint defence as a basis for complete military unity between the two regions.

4. The Committee for Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research, headed on the Iraqi side by Mr. 'Izzat Ibrahim, Member of the RCC and Minister of the Interior, and, on the Syrian side, by Mr. Zuhair Masharqa, Minister of Education.

The Committee shall work to achieve unified curricula in the field of education as well as coordination and cooperation in the field of scientific research.

Each committee can add to its membership the number of specialists that it deems necessary.

The meetings of the central committees shall be determined by agreement of their chairmen. Each committee must submit a report of its activities to the Higher Political Commission at least two weeks before the scheduled meeting of the Commission.

The decision of the committees are subject to the approval of the Higher Commission. The Commission can delegate to the committees the power of implementing decisions that it feels need not be presented to it.

Hafiz al-Assad
President of the Syrian Arab Republic

Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr
Chairman of the RCC and President of the Iraqi Republic

Baghdad, October 26, 1978.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE NINTH ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE, BAGHDAD, NOVEMBER 5, 1978.¹

At the initiative of the government of the Iraqi Republic and at the invitation of President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, the Ninth Arab Summit Conference was held in Baghdad in the period between Novem-

¹ Published in the Damascus daily Tishrin, November 6, 1978 — Ed.
The conference conducted its deliberations in a spirit of intense national responsibility and common concern for a united Arab policy in the face of the dangers and challenges threatening the Arab nation, especially in the wake of developments arising from the signing of the two Camp David agreements by the Egyptian government and its effect upon the Arab struggle to confront the Zionist aggression against the Arab nation.

Motivated by the principles to which the Arab nation subscribes and based upon the unity of Arab destiny and in commitment to the tradition of joint Arab action, the conference affirmed the following basic principles:

1. The Palestine question is one of Arab destiny. It is the crux of the conflict with the Zionist enemy. All sons of the Arab nation and all Arab countries are involved in it and all are duty-bound to struggle for its sake and offer all material and moral sacrifices necessary in its behalf.

The struggle to recover Arab rights in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories is a common national responsibility. All Arabs must join this struggle, according to their standing and their military, economic, political and other resources. The battle against the Zionist enemy is not confined to those countries whose territories were occupied in 1967. It involves the entire Arab nation because of the military, political, economic and cultural threats posed by the Zionist enemy to the entire Arab nation, to its basic national interests and to its culture and destiny. This fact imposes upon all Arab countries the responsibility of taking part in this struggle and of employing all their resources to that end.

2. All Arab countries must furnish all kinds of support, aid and facilities to the struggle of the Palestinian resistance in all its forms, through the PLO, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied homeland. This is to be done for the sake of liberation and the recovery of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state on their national soil. All Arab states are committed to protect Palestinian national unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestinian action.

3. [The conference reaffirmed its] commitment to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, especially the sixth and seventh summits held in Algiers and Rabat.

4. Proceeding from the principles outlined above, one such cardinal principle which cannot be flouted or treated lightly is that it is not permissible for any single Arab side to act unilaterally with regard to any settlement of the Palestinian question in particular and to the Arab-Zionist conflict in general.

5. No settlement is acceptable unless it is adopted by a resolution of an Arab summit conference held specifically for this purpose.

The conference discussed the two agreements signed at Camp David by the Egyptian government. It believes them to be harmful to the rights of the Palestinian people, the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories; it also believes that these agreements were arrived at outside the framework of collective Arab responsibility. Furthermore, they are in conflict with the resolutions of Arab summit conferences, especially the Algiers and Rabat conferences, as well as with the Charter of the Arab League and with UN resolutions on Palestine. They will not lead to the just peace that the Arab nation is seeking.

Accordingly, the conference resolved not to accept these two agreements and to have nothing to do with any results that may ensue and to reject all their
political, economic, juridical and other consequences.

The conference decided to invite the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to go back upon these two agreements and not to sign any peace treaty with the enemy.

The conference hopes that Egypt will return to the fold of common Arab action and will not act unilaterally in matters relating to the Arab-Zionist conflict. In this regard, the conference adopted a number of resolutions and measures in order to meet this new situation and to protect the objectives and interests of the Arab nation, in the belief that the Arab nation, with all its material and moral resources and with its solidarity, is capable of confronting those difficult conditions and meeting all challenges, as it has done throughout its history, because it is acting in defence of truth, justice and its national existence.

The conference stressed the importance of unifying all Arab efforts in order to rectify the strategic imbalance that may result from Egypt's departure from the arena of confrontation. The conference decided that those states that are ready and able to participate effectively must coordinate their efforts. The conference further affirmed the necessity of adhering to the regulations of the Arab boycott and to the implementation of its provisions.

The conference examined the means necessary to develop the Arab information media directed to the outside world in a manner that would serve the interest of just Arab causes.

The conference decided to hold meetings of the Arab summit conference annually and designated November of each year as the conference month.

Having examined the situation in the Arab world and abroad, the conference reaffirmed the adherence of the Arab nation to a just peace based upon total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem, and reaffirmed the maintenance of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state on their national soil.

The conference resolved to undertake the most extensive international efforts in order to set forth the just rights of the Palestinian people and of the Arab nation. The conference expresses sincere thanks and appreciation to all states that have supported just Arab rights.

The conference expressed its appreciation of the Syrian Arab Republic and of its steadfast and heroic army as well as its appreciation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its heroic army. It further expressed its pride in the struggle of the Palestinian people and their steadfastness, both inside and outside the occupied homeland, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The conference gave its blessing to the Charter of Joint National Action recently signed between the two fraternal regions, Syria and Iraq, and considers it to be an important achievement on the path of Arab solidarity.

The conference further expressed its deep appreciation of the initiative taken by the fraternal Iraqi government headed by President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr in calling for the convening of an Arab summit conference in Baghdad with a view to unifying the Arab ranks and channelling common Arab efforts to face the threats to which the Arab nation is at present exposed.

It further expressed its appreciation of the valuable efforts made by President Bakr to ensure the success of the conference.